Posted on August 03, 2025
On August 1, when the clock struck Midnight Eastern Time, a new era in world trade was inaugurated – that which could not remember its reciprocity or its equity, but for the raw lever of American power. With the deployment of new reciprocal prices as part of the so -called “Liberation Day” strategy of President Donald Trump, dozens of nations have been forced to conclude last -minute trade agreements which, below the surface, have a striking resemblance to the 19th century “unequal treaties”. Only this time, they were not written under the threat of a firearm, but threatened with economic coercion.
The United States, claiming to correct trade deficits and restore interior manufacturing, have essentially forced trade partners to accept higher prices, give up regulatory land and engage in strategic economic realignments, while guaranteeing minimum concessions on its part. For countries like Vietnam and Indonesia, and even the European Union, the consequences could be of great scale, to reshape industrial policies, to modify investment incentives and, above all, to undermine economic sovereignty.
The public justification of the Trump administration for this aggressive redesign of trade is the need to rebalance global trade deficits. The complaint is simple: the United States has lost trade and it is time to “even the rules of the game”. However, this rhetoric masks a complex and asymmetrical network of prices and conditions which believe the supposed principle of reciprocity.
Take Vietnam, for example. Under his agreement with Washington, Hanoi accepted a tariff of 20% on most exports to the United States, plus an amazing 40% sample on transhibited goods; A direct blow to the unique status of Vietnam as a production center for world giants like Foxconn, Apple, Intel and Nike. With 71.7% of Vietnamese exports from companies abroad, this transhipment clause is more than customs technicality; It strikes the heart of the growth model focused on Vietnam exports. In return, Vietnam was forced to offer zero prices on certain American imports, including large motor cars, an almost negligible sector on the internal market of Vietnam but an important victory for American exporters.
Indonesia, similarly, has obtained a slightly lower rate rate – 19% instead of the 32% initially threatened – but only by agreeing to buy American Boeing aircraft and to remove or reduce various trade barriers.
Beyond the prices, transactions are increasingly encroaching on the internal economic policies of sovereign states. The requirements concerning “transhipment restrictions” and the “security of the supply chain”-wandering but powerful instruments allow the United States to dictate how and where its partners manufacture vague but powerful instruments that allow the United States to dictate how and where its partners manufacture instruments. These clauses give Washington an indirect influence on national industrial strategies, in particular in countries where direct foreign investment constitutes the backbone of growth.
For the European Union, the issues are no less serious. The agreement requested an investment of $ 600 billion in EU States in the US economy, effectively exporting the European capital and potentially jobs to American soil. Even more controversial is the clause demanding that the EU buy $ 750 billion in American energy over three years, a decision that French officials call without “capitulation”. Energy policy, long considered as a pillar of national sovereignty, is now subject to the bilateral mechanisms of the application of trade.
In commercial diplomacy, access to the American consumer market may be the most coveted price. The Trump administration armed this lever effect to extract large -scale concessions. For some countries, the alternative to the signing of an agreement is punitive: Mexico faces a coverage rate of 25% and Canada, a better American trading partner, could see prices of up to 35% on goods not in accordance with existing USMCA.
Meanwhile, India – although it was nicknamed one “friend” by Trump – was struck by a 25% rate in all areas, plus an unpertified penalty linked to its energy transactions with Russia. Such measures strengthen the opinion that these “agreements” concern less trade and more the alignment of partners with the American geopolitical objectives.
Even when countries have managed to avoid the worst prices, transactions were often asymmetrical. South Korea, for example, has accepted a rate of 15% on its exports while promising $ 350 billion in American investments and by granting zero prices on American agricultural and automotive exports. These are not commercial negotiations in the traditional sense. These are economic ultimatums wrapped in the diplomatic language.
Ironically, although these transactions are designed as a victory for American workers, they can end up harming American consumers and industries. According to the Yale Budget LAB, the average American cleaning could face $ 2,400 in additional annual costs due to higher prices on imported goods – in fact a hidden tax. In addition, the American industries based on foreign components, such as electronics, pharmaceutical products and textiles, will be faced with disturbed supply chains and upwards production costs.
This suggests that the main beneficiaries of these aggressive trade agreements are not consumers or American workers, but rather a political narrative built around economic nationalism and short -term geopolitical gains.
What makes these commercial pacts modern so disturbing is how echoing the “unequal treaties” in colonial history. In the 19th century, Western powers extracted the unbalanced agreements of Asian nations, forcing them to open ports, to accept foreign competence and to buy unwanted goods. Today, the United States does not require extraterritorial rights, but it is imposing conditions that interfere with national industrial policies, force purchases of American products and limit the autonomy of states to develop their own commercial strategies.
In the longer term, this coercive commercial strategy can turn against him by undermining the very multilateral institutions that govern world trade for decades. The World Trade Organization, already weakened, is increasingly dismissed while the bilateral power policy dominates. Meanwhile, countries that feel trapped by American tactics can look for alternative commercial blocks, perhaps turn to China, regional groups or even the formation of counter-alliances.
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, chief economist of the IMF, warned broader risks this week: “The restoration of the stability of commercial policy is essential to reduce the uncertainty of policies … Collective efforts should be made to restore and improve the world trading system,” said Al Jazeera. His words are a plea not only for economic mental health, but for the preservation of an order based on rules.
While the United States has the right to renegotiate the commercial terms which it deems unfair, equity must be mutual. These new “agreements”, far from establishing fair trade, impose a version of the 21st century of the unequal treaty – a change that could have deep consequences for world diplomacy, international economic development and cooperation.
